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Abstract
In the engineering, the formation of a typical principal-agent relationship is formed between the owner and the 
engineering-construction supervisor. The owner entrusts the supervisor with the construction management and 
monitors his work. The owner’s question is how to choose the right commission model on the basis of his 
monitoring capacity and design an optimal contract to encourage the supervisor to choose action which meets the 
owner’s maximal interest. By comparing the supervisor’ s optimal behavior choices under the incentive contract 
which only contains sharing the result and under the incentive-monitoring contract which contains sharing the result 
and monitoring the process, this article proves that when the level of the owner’s monitoring capacity is higher than 
a critical value, the owner should choose partial commission model and design the incentive-monitoring 
contract ,and keep improving his level of monitoring capacity in order to pursue the higher level of the supervisor’s 
effort. When the level of the owner’s monitoring capacity is lower than the critical value, the owner should choose 
complete commission model and design the incentive contract which only contains sharing the result. In view of the 
engineering practice, we point out that the competence of the owner’s representative will impact the owner’s
optimal choice.
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1. Introduction
The engineering-construction supervision system is the result of socialization of production and division of labor 
based on specialization.Internationally, a consulting engineer, which has been defined as a “professional
experienced in the application of scientific principles to engineering problems”, renders a professional service, also
operates a business. The investors must pay high cost nearly about 15% of total project investment or more for 
completely commissioning the professional organization to render engineering-construction supervision and 
management functions. The production of domestic engineering construction supervision is also based on the 
assumption that the owner has no knowledge about the construction management, but the difference is that in our 
country the owner usually arranges the representative to monitor the supervisor and only commissions the 
supervisor partial right.  
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In engineering practice, foreign engineering consulting system usually is complete commission model and “turn-
key” project is normal. After imposing the engineering-construction supervision in our country, because of the
diversification in the investment subject, there exist great differences among different investment subjects on the 
owner’s commission model, such as complete commission model, highly empowering model, partial commission 
model and complete false commission model. For example, the complete commission model and the highly 
empowering model are usually used in the government projects in which the owner just makes a simple 
communication and coordination with the supervisor. In the extreme cases, the complete false commission model is 
used in private capital investing projects in which the supervisor only takes charge of dealing and improving the 
statutory procedures of commission and completely is not involved in the process of project management, and the 
owner do the most work of project management. In most cases, the partial commission model usually is used by the 
owner, in which the supervisor takes charge of the engineering quality and safety, and cost control and progress 
control are often not completely authorized to the supervisor.
Owing to the asymmetry information between the owner and the supervisor, the owner commissions partial or 
complete right of project management to the supervisor, but can not accurately observe his behavior options, so the 
supervisor may be lazy or collusion with contractor to seek damaging the interests of owner. Based on his
monitoring capacity, the owner should choose the right commission model and design the optical commission 
contract in order to encourage the supervisor to choose his optical action which meets the owner’s maximal interest. 
This article, on the basis of the principal-agent theory, by comparing the supervisor’s optimal behavior choices 
under the incentive contract which only contains sharing the result and under the incentive-monitoring contract 
which contains sharing the result and monitoring the process, points out that how the owner to choose right 
commission model and design the optical commission contract. To simplify the analysis, we divide the commission 
model into complete commission model and partial commission model.
2. The game equilibrium under the complete commission model
Principal - agent theory was used to model the following problems: the client would like the agent to choose 
behavior according to his own maximal interest, but he can not observe the choice of agent’s behavior directly, only 
can observe a number of other variables, which are depend on the agent’s actions and the exogenous random factors 
and only are incomplete information about the agent’s actions. The client's problem is how to design a commission 
contract to reward or punishment the agent based on these observed information in order to encourage the agent to 
choose the actions which maximize the client’s interest. In the engineering project, the formation of a typical 
principal-agent relationship is formed between the owner and the supervisor. In order to study conveniently, we used 
an example of principle-agent models in the book of Zhang Weiying (2004) "Game theory and information 
economics"[1]
2.1. The basic assumptions of the model
to build the principle-agent relationship between the owner and the supervisor, which other articles [2] 
- [4] have also used to analyze this principal - agent relationship under the engineering supervision institution.
We usually assume that the owner is risk neutral, and the supervisor is risk circumvented. The owner, as a 
rational investor, is usually with a neutral attitude to risk, and the supervisor, as a high-knowledge, high-tech 
employee, bears the responsibility of the construction quality for life, so it is realistic that assuming the supervisor is 
risk circumvented. S , meaning the outcome, is the result of the supervisor’s work, and we assume that it is the only 
variable which can be observed directly by the owner and that its poverty belongs to the owner. a , meaning the 
level of the supervisor’s effort, is a set of one-dimensional continuous random variable; T means the state of nature, 
and has no relationship with a ;the outcome S is impacted by the level of effort a and the state of nature T
collectively. Assume that aS T  ˈin which  2~ 0,N TT V . Because of the asymmetric information, the owner 
can not observe supervisor’s action directly, but can observe the outcome directly which is be related to the level of 
efforts, and the owner can infer the level of supervisor’s efforts. The owner’s question is how to encourage the 
supervisor to choose his action which meets the owner’s maximal interest by designing an optimal incentive contract 
( )s S which contains sharing the result. Assume ( )s S D ES  , in which D is a constant, and E means the owner’s 
incentive coefficient based on the outcomeS . Assume ( ( ))v sS S , ( ( ))u s S is the owner’s and supervisor’s utility 
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function respectively, ( )c a means the supervisor’s cost function expressed by the money , 2( )
2
b
c a a , 0,b !
( )
0,
dc a
da
!
2
2
( )
0,
d c a
da
! namely, the marginal cost of the supervisor’s efforts is increasing.
2.2. The game equilibrium under the incentive contract which only contains sharing the result
Because the owner is risk neutral, his expected utility equals to his expected income, so that 
( ( )) (1 )Ev s aS S D E                                                                                                                                      (1)
The supervisor’s actual income is that:
2( ) ( )
2
b
w s c a aS D ES    
The supervisor’s expectation of his actual income is that:
2 2( )
2 2
b b
Ew E a a aD ES D E     
We assume that the supervisor’s utility function has characteristics of constant absolute risk aversion, U is a 
measure of absolute risk aversion, the supervisor’s certainty equivalent income is equal to the mean of random 
income minus the cost of risk, so his certainty equivalent income is that: 
2 2 21 1( )
2 2 2
b
Ew Var w a a TU D E UE V    
The supervisor’s maximal expected utility is equal to his certainty equivalent income, i.e.
2 2 21
2 2
b
Eu a a TD E UE V                                                                                                                                  (2)
Construct the following principal-agent model:
, ,
max (1 )
a
a
D E
D E  
. .s t 2 2 21( )
2 2
b
IR a a wTD E UE V

   t ˄the supervisor’s individual rationality constraint˅                            (3)
2 2 21( ) max
2 2a
b
IC a a TD E UE V   ˄the supervisor’s incentive compatibility constraint˅
The IR constraint should be equation owning to the owner pursuing to maximize his utility, so we get 
2 2 21
2 2
b
a a wTD E UE V

    
2 2 21( )
2 2
b
w a a TD E UE V

                                                                                      (4)
The first order condition of maximizing IC constraint’s is that: 0baE   
                                                                                                          *a
b
E                                                          
(5)
Substituting formula 4and 5 into the objective function, we get that:
2 2 21max ( ) (1 )
2 2
b
w
b b bTE
E E EE UE V E

    
Simplification is that:   
2
2 21max
2 2
w
b b TE
E E UE V

                                                                                               (6)
The first order condition of maximizing the objective function is that: 2
1
0
b b T
E UEV   
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1
1 b T
E
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
                                        (7)
From the foregoing analysis we get the game equilibrium under the incentive contract which only contains 
sharing the result:
2
* * *
2 2 2 2
11 1
, ,
1 (1 ) 2 (1 )
b
a w
b b b b b
T
T T T
UVE D
UV UV UV
 
   
  
                                                        (8)
The owner’s expected income is that: 
   
2
2 2 2 2
1 1 1
(1 ) (1 )
2 (1 ) 1 (1 )
b
Ev a w w
b b b b b
T
T T T
UVD E
UV UV UV
 
        
  
2
1
2 (1 )
w
b b TUV

 

                                                                                                                                        (9)
From this equilibrium we know that in the complete commission model the owner’s optimal incentive 
coefficient *E has inversely-proportional relationship with the supervisor’s effort cost coefficient b , the measure of 
supervisor’s absolute risk aversion U , and the uncertainty of the exogenous variable in incentive contact which 
contains sharing the result. The supervisor’s optical effort level is also determined by the supervisor’s effort cost 
coefficient, the measure of supervisor’s absolute risk aversion, and the uncertainty of the exogenous variable 
collectively. This equilibrium shows that the supervisor’s characteristics determine the owner’s optimal motivation 
effect and the supervisor’s optimal effort level. So the owner in the choice of supervisor should take the supervisor’s 
qualifications, experience, risk taking propensity, etc. into account, and according to these factors design an optical
incentive coefficient to maximize the level of supervisor’s effort. 
3. The game equilibrium under the partial commission model
3.1. The game equilibrium result under the incentive-monitoring contract which contains sharing the result and 
monitoring the process 
In the partial commission model we assume that the owner can observe the results of the supervisor’s effort, but 
also can monitor the process of his work. m means the monitoring result on the supervisor’s work, 
assuming m a N  ,in which N means monitoring dynamic, 2~ (0, )N NN V ,and the exogenous variable T is 
independent with monitoring dynamicN .Assuming 
2
1
NV
means the level of monitoring capacity, namely how much  
the monitoring results can reflect the supervisor’s efforts, the smaller 2NV is ,the higher the level of monitoring 
capacity is, and the greater the monitoring dynamic is. Suppose the owner’s commission function 
is ( , )s m mS D ES J   , in which E means the incentive coefficient for the outcome S , J means the incentive 
coefficient for the monitoring result m . Let the owner’s supervision cost function is 2( )yc NV , in
which
2 2 2
2 2 2
( ) ( )
0, 0
( )
y ydc d c
d d
N N
N N
V V
V V
 ! , meaning that with the increase of the level of monitoring capacity, the owner’s 
monitoring costs is increasing in an incremental speed. Other assumptions are as described earlier.
The owner is risk neutral, his expected utility equal to his expected income, so that
2 2( ( , ) ( )) (1 ) ( )y yEv Ev s m c a cN NS S V D E J V                                                                                       (10)
The supervisor’s actual income is that:
2( , ) ( )
2
b
w s m c a m aS D ES J      ,
and his certainty equivalent income is that: 
2 2 2 2 21 ( )
2 2
b
Eu a a a T ND E J U E V J V                                                                                                       (11)
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So the supervisor’s maximal expected utility is equal to his certainty equivalent income, i.e.
2 2 2 2 21 ( )
2 2
b
Eu a a a T ND E J U E V J V     
Construct the following principal-agent mode:
2
2
, , ,
max (1 ) ( )ya c
N
N
D E J V
D E J V    
. .s t 2 2 2 2 21( ) ( )
2 2
b
IR a a a wT ND E J U E V J V

     t                                                                                          (12)
2 2 2 2 21( ) max ( )
2 2a
b
IC a a a T ND E J U E V J V    
Let the IR constrain is equation and we can get that:
2 2 2 2 21 ( )
2 2
b
a a a wT ND E J U E V J V

      
2 2 2 2 21 ( )
2 2
b
w a a a T ND E J U E V J V
 ª º     « »¬ ¼
                                                                                                  (13)
The first order condition of maximizing IC constraint’s is that: 0baE J   
*a
b
E J                                          (14)
Substituting formula 13 and 14 into the objective function, we get that:
2
2 2 2 2 2 2
, ,
1
max ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
2 2 y
b
w c
b b b bN
T N N
E J V
E J E J E J E JE J U E V J V E J V
   ª º        « »¬ ¼
Simplification is that: 
2
2
2 2 2 2 2
, ,
( ) 1
max ( ) ( )
2 2 y
w c
b bN
T N N
E J V
E J E J U E V J V V
                                                     (15)
The first order condition of the objective function maximizing is that:
2 ' 2( ) 1 ( ) 0y
E v
c
b b T N
E J UEV V
E
w      
w
                                                                                                           (16)
2 ' 2( ) 1 ( ) 0y
E v
c
b b N N
E J UJV V
J
w      
w
                                                                                                             (17)
' 2
2
( )
( ) 0y
E v
c N
N
UJ V
V
w     
w
                                                                                                                                   (18)
Solve these three function and we get that:
' 2( )yc NV UJ                                                                                                                                                       (19)
2
*
2 2 2 2( 1)b
N
T N T N
VE
V V UV V
 
  
                                                                                                                           (20)
2
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2 2 2 2( 1)b
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T N T N
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V V UV V
 
  
                                                                                                                           (21)
From the foregoing analysis we find the game equilibrium under the incentive-control contract which contains 
sharing the result and monitoring the process, namely:
2
*
2 2 2 2( 1)b
N
T N T N
VE
V V UV V
 
  
ˈ
2
*
2 2 2 2( 1)b
T
T N T N
VJ
V V UV V
 
  
ˈ                                                             (22)
2
2 2
2 2 2 2
( ) ,
( 1)y
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T
N N
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UVV V
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22 2 2 2
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b
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V V UV VD
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 
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3.2. The owner’s optical behavior choice
By comparing the owner’s optical behavior choices under the incentive contract which only contains sharing the 
result and under the incentive-monitoring contract which contains sharing the result and monitoring the process, we 
get several conclusions as follows.
3.2.1. The level of the owner’s monitoring capacity determines the form of his optical commission contract and the 
commission model
2 2 2 2 2
*
1 2 2 2 2 2 2
( )1
(1 ) (1 ) ( 1)
b b
a
b b b b b
T N T N T
T T T N T N
V V UV V UV
UV UV V V UV V
  
  
 ª º   ¬ ¼
ˈ
2 2 2 2 2 2 4
*
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2( 1) (1 ) ( 1)
b b
a
b b b b b
T N T N T N T
T N T N T T N T N
V V V V UV V UV
V V UV V UV V V UV V
   
  
ª º ª º      ¬ ¼ ¬ ¼
ˈ
Let * *1 2a a! , we get that
2 2
2
2 1
b
b
T T
N
T
UV VV
UV

!

So we can find that:
When
2 2
2
2
, 1
1
b
b
b
T T
N
T
UV VV U
UV

 !

, * *1 2a a .
When
2 2
2
2 1
b
b
T T
N
T
UV VV
UV

t

, * *1 2a a! .
Noticing, when
2 2
2
2 1
b
b
T T
N
T
UV VV
UV

 

, the incentive coefficient based on results of the monitoring does not exist, 
and we think that in this case * *1 2a a! .
We can see that, when the level of the owner’s monitoring capacity
2
2 2 2
11 b
b
T
N T T
UV
V UV V

!

, the supervisor’s optical 
effort level is higher than the one under the incentive contract which only contains sharing the result, so at this time 
the owner should put the monitor result into the commission contract and choose the partial commission model in
order to improve the supervisor’s optical effort level. Besides, because
*
2
2
0
a
NV
w

w
,
2
*
2
1
0,
a
NV
w
!
w
the owner should 
continue to improve his monitoring capacity in order to obtain a higher level of supervisor’s efforts. When the level
of the owner’s monitoring capacity
2
2 2 2
11 b
b
T
N T T
UV
V UV V

d

, the supervisor’s optical effort level is lower than the one 
under the incentive contract which only contains sharing the result, so at this time the owner should not put the 
monitor results into the commission contract and choose the complete commission model as the owner’s monitor 
will reduce the optimal level of supervisor’s effort.
3.2.2. The impact of the competence of the owner’s representative on the game equilibrium result
In view of the engineering practice, the article [5] has pointed that there are multiple principal-agent relationships 
in reality, and in a particular task there is a specific representative who monitors the supervisor’s work instead of the 
owner. The characteristics of the representative, such as professional knowledge, work attitude, ethics and so on, 
will determine the competence which is the capacity for doing his work. The representative’s competence can affect 
the level of the owner’s monitoring capacity and change the supervisor’s optical behavior choice. Obviously, the
low level of competence will lead to the low level of the owner’s monitoring capacity, and at this time the owner 
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had better choose the complete commission model and the representative’s low competence will reduce the optimal 
level of supervisor’s effort. The high level of competence will lead to the high level of the owner’s monitoring 
capacity, and at this time the owner had better choose the partial commission model and the representative’s high 
competence will increase the optimal level of supervisor’s effort. So we point that the owner must choose the better 
representative on the basis of his competence, and then choose the right commission model and design the optical 
commission contract to courage the supervisor to choose the higher effort level.
4. Conclusions
When the level of the owner’s monitoring capacity is lower than a critical value, the owner will choose the 
complete commission model in which the owner takes no account of monitoring the supervisor’s work, and uses the 
incentive contract that only contains sharing the result. At this time, both the owner’s optimal incentive 
coefficient *E and the supervision’s optical effort level *a have inversely-proportional relationships with the 
supervisor’s effort cost coefficient b , the measure of supervisor’s absolute risk aversion U , and the uncertainty of 
the exogenous variable. In order to improve the supervisor’s optical effort level, in addition to setting the right 
incentive coefficient, the owner must consider the supervisor’s characters in choosing the supervision, such as 
educational background, experience, daring to take risks or not and other factors. The owner’s monitor to the 
supervisor’s work will not increase the supervisor’s optimal effort level.
When the level of the owner’s monitoring capacity is higher than the critical value, he will choose the partial 
commission model in which the owner empowers the supervisor partial right to manage the project and uses the 
incentive-control contract that contains sharing the result and monitoring the process. At this time, the supervisor’s 
optical effort level *a has direct-proportional relationship with the level of the owner’s monitoring capacity. So in 
order to improve the supervisor’s effort level the owner should monitor the supervisor’s work and increase the level
of his monitoring capacity continually, the owner has more initiative and impact on the supervisor’s behavior 
choice.
In view of the engineering practice, the competence of the owner’s representative will impact the owner’s
optimal choice, and the owner must choose the better representative on the basis of his competence, and then choose 
the right commission model and design the optical commission contract to courage the supervisor to choose the 
higher effort level.
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